Affected services were restored by updating the target systems' network allow-lists to include the clients' current outgoing IP addresses. Examples from the tickets: the Workday↔sFTP flow was reinstated after the server-side whitelist was updated to include Workday IPs 18.157.252.162 and 63.177.152.86; access to an Azure SQL instance from AWS DWH hosts was restored after the database firewall allowed the AWS DWH IPs (18.153.45.180 and 18.158.197.134). Where vendor migrations included planned IP/cipher changes (Pearson VUE), connections were validated against the new IP ranges and SFTP security baseline to ensure compatibility with the updated endpoint configuration.

Network connectivity and printing were restored by adding or enabling firewall rules on the local site firewalls to permit the specific client→device traffic. Implementation details from incidents: a rule was added to allow the Study‑PC (7.33.32.50) to reach the Study‑Printer (7.25.45.52), and MSR2/IUGMSR2FW firewall rules were enabled to permit traffic between 10.34.80.50 and 10.26.93.53 (restoring printing and KMS access). Changes were verified by successful pings and test prints after the rules were applied.

The incidents were resolved by adjusting the inspection policy to allow the legitimate application traffic or by creating IPS/inspection exceptions for the service. In the Avaya ACCS case, investigation identified the Check Point IPS blade as the blocker for ACCS HTTP traffic; exempting or tuning the IPS rule for the ACCS endpoints removed the false-positive blocking and restored the reporting interface. The fixes focused on permitting the application protocol for the specific server(s) while retaining broader IPS protections.

Mitigation was implemented on the mail gateway by enabling SMTP flood protection and applying targeted whitelisting for legitimate internal senders. The gateway's flood-protection settings were used to throttle the flood and then whitelist exceptions were applied where required; monitoring was added to observe recurrence. These measures reduced the SMTP overflow alerts and restored mail delivery to the MX.

Investigations identified network-level blocking of the exam application's server→client communication as the failure mode. Restorations in similar cases required allowing the e‑test's application ports through intervening firewalls and verifying that the e‑test service listener had the necessary permissions to accept and initiate the server→client messages. The ticket set referenced the application's TCP port range (5656–5676) as relevant for connectivity and confirmed that enabling allowed traffic for those flows resolved server→client timeouts where applied.

Accessibility was restored for affected cohorts by providing alternative content delivery and library support rather than relying on the blocked external services. Actions taken included handing over content to library services, providing downloadable PDF versions of readings, and preparing alternative media hosting or library-provided access paths to ensure essential readings and documents were reachable from restricted regions. These content workarounds maintained course access where direct external services were blocked by national firewalls.